Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 19 | Issue 2

Article 6

3-1-2005

Incarceration of the Free Exercise Clause: The Sixth
Circuit's Misstep in Cutter v. Wilkinson
James B. McMullin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
James B. McMullin, Incarceration of the Free Exercise Clause: The Sixth Circuit's Misstep in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 19 BYU J. Pub. L. 413
(2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol19/iss2/6

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Incarceration of the Free Exercise Clause: The Sixth
Circuit’s Misstep in Cutter v. Wilkinson
[T]he holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . but to
exalt it by its influence on reason alone; [as compared with] . . . the
impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as
ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men,
have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own
opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as
such endeavoring to impose them on others . . . .1

– Thomas Jefferson
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RLUIPA
Thomas Jefferson’s quote reflects a dichotomy that is characteristic
of many of the Constitutional Founders: a strong faith punctuated by a
determined desire to face God in their own way free of the fetters of a
state religion. The First Amendment embodies this duality and gives it
expression through the competing interests of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. Yet, the passage of the First Amendment did not end
the tension between protection of religious liberties and the threat of
government-established religion. Instead, that pronouncement ushered in
a judicial and legislative balancing act of these religion clauses that has
continued since the Founding. Recently this balancing act resulted in
passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act
(“RLUIPA”) and a circuit split with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in
Cutter v. Wilkinson declaring RLUIPA unconstitutional.2
When introducing the bill that became RLUIPA, co-sponsors
Senators Hatch and Kennedy stated, “Far more than any other
Americans, persons residing in institutions are subject to the authority of
one or a few local officials.”3 In this setting, “[i]t is well known that
prisoners often file frivolous claims; it is less well known that prison

1. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 12, 1779), reprinted
in, 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Learner eds., 1987).
2. 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
3. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
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officials sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules” many of which
unjustifiably burden prisoners’ religious freedoms.4 As a result of years
of hearings regarding prisoner’s religious freedoms Congress concluded
some additional legal protection was required to protect institutionalized
persons’ religious liberty from being restricted in “egregious and
unnecessary ways.”5 RLUIPA is its most recent solution.6
RLUIPA is a federal act passed in 2000 in response to the demise of
its predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in City
of Boerne v. Flores, paired with the perception that institutionalized
persons need additional protection of their religious rights from
governmental infringement.7 RLUIPA’s section three specifically applies
to governmental regulations that burden institutionalized persons’
exercise of religion.8 Accordingly, RLUIPA was one of the basis relied
upon by plaintiffs in Cutter v. Wilkinson.9 This case consolidated three
Ohio prisoners’ challenges to prison regulations that impinged upon the
exercise of their respective religious beliefs.10 While not admitting
liability under RLUIPA the state of Ohio responded in Cutter by arguing
that, first, it was not violating RLUIPA and that, second, even if it is
violating RLUIPA, the Act is unconstitutional.11
As a result, the Sixth Circuit in Cutter addressed the constitutionality
of RLUIPA under the Establishment Clause and determined that it was
unconstitutional.12 This decision merits close attention because it stands
with only two district courts against an “apparent juggernaut of circuit
and district court opinions” that specifically uphold RLUIPA or RFRA’s
First Amendment constitutionality.13 Furthermore, the Cutter court’s
decision warrants close attention because RLUIPA introduces an
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). Boerne found RFRA unconstitutional for federalism
concerns. Id. at 515-16. Both RFRA and RLUIPA utilize strict scrutiny in evaluating neutral
government laws that incidentally burden religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2004);
146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 (2004) (also held unconstitutional by Al Ghashiyah v.
Dep’t of Corr. 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003)).
9. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
10. 349 F.3d 257, 259 (6th Cir. 2003). The three cases were combined for circuit court
review because they each hinged on the constitutionality of RLUIPA. Id. at 259-60.
11. Id. at 264-67 (specifically finding it has the impermissible effect of promoting religious
exercise as more fully described infra Part V.B discussion of the effects prong).
12. Id. at 268-69. In contrast to Boerne in which the Court addressed federalism concerns for
RFRA, the Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to address federalism concerns and limited its analysis
to the Establishment Clause.
13. Id. at 262. (citing the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as finding either RFRA
or RLUIPA constitutional).
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appreciable risk of impermissible governmental support of religion—yet
without RLUIPA, there is a risk for significant erosion of protection for
religious expression by institutionalized persons.
Although the prisoners’ suit extends beyond RLUIPA based claims
this Note limits its analysis to the Cutter court’s rationale under the
Establishment Clause. This narrow focus seems appropriate given that
the Establishment Clause is the only issue over which the district and
circuit courts are in direct conflict and is the only issue addressed to the
Supreme Court in the parties’ petition for certiorari.14
In analyzing Cutter, Part II outlines the reasons Congress considered
in passing RLUIPA. Part III reviews the legal developments that led to
the passage of RLUIPA. Part IV then sketches the relevant factual
scenario presented to the Cutter court including the case’s procedural
history and the court’s holding. Following this background material Part
V analyzes the court’s reasoning and concludes the court wrongly held
that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, it explains
that although the court facially applied the Lemon v. Kurtzman test
(“Lemon test”) in its Establishment Clause analysis, it improperly relied
upon non-precedential factors in applying the Lemon test, used flawed
reasoning, and wrongly dismissed RLUIPA’s jurisprudential support to
hold that RLUIPA is unconstitutional.15 Part VI then addresses a few of
RLUIPA’s potential problems by acknowledging the burdens it may
place upon states’ penal systems. But it argues that such policy-based
concerns are best addressed through the legislature rather than the courts.
Finally, Part VII urges that upon review the Supreme Court should apply
the Lemon test as applied in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos16 and Madison v. Riter17 to
overturn the Sixth Circuit’s holding and uphold RLUIPA’s
Establishment Clause constitutionality.
II. WHY RLUIPA, WHY NOW?
By definition, incarceration entails some measure of control over the
incarcerated. State institutions and specifically prisons, are highly
regulated environments in which uniformity of schedule, appearance, and
activity for purposes of security and economy are top priorities.18 Given
14. E.g. Brief for the United States at 9, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003),
petition for certiorari filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3229 (No. 03-9877).
15. See generally Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
16. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
17. 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
18. Developments in the Law – The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1891 (2002)
[hereinafter Developments].
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the control necessary to imprison and society’s general suspicion of
prisoners’ motivations for religious activity, extensive limitations on
religious expression during incarceration have long been tolerated.19
Naturally, because of the United State’s traditional religious make-up,
those religious expressions not conforming to the traditional Protestant
mold have often been prohibited or severely limited.20 However, modern
sensibilities are offended when religious liberties are restricted in
“egregious and unnecessary ways” that yield little benefit to prison
administrators’ goal of security. 21 Many of these offending restrictions
result from a drive for efficiency seasoned with ignorance, lack of
resources, and often, plain indifference.22 The effect of these restrictions
has been exacerbated keenly since the 1960s with the dramatic
proliferation of variety in religious preferences among inmates, a
burgeoning prison population, and the resultant budgetary pressures on
the penal system.23
After years of hearings receiving testimony of unwarranted
restriction on religious practice in general and discrimination among
religious practices in prisons, Congress determined that action was
required.24 Congressional testimony described penal restrictions on
religious activity that did not pose a threat to security or even efficiency.
This testimony included accounts such as the following: Prohibiting a
Catholic priest from bringing a small amount of sacramental wine into
prison.25 Or, prison administrators’ refusal to purchase or accept donated
matzo (the unleaved bread some Jews eat at Passover) from a Jewish
organization.26 In addition, prior to RLUIPA prison administrators often
refused to make selective accommodations for adherents of non-majority
religions.27 For example, Muslim inmates were denied Islamic prayer oil
even “though other kinds of fragrant body oils and lotions were made
available to inmates.”28 Finally, Congress heard testimony of sectarian
discrimination in the accommodations afforded prisoners, such as
19. Id.
20. See id. at 1892.
21. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senators
Hatch and Kennedy).
22. Id.
23. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1893. A prime example of change in the religious
identity of prison populations was the dramatic rise of predominantly African-American male
Muslims in prison during the 1960’s. Id.
24. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 3, Cutter (No. 039877).
25. Id. at S7777.
26. Id.
27. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 11-12, Cutter (No.
03-9877).
28. Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2003).
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permitting the lighting of votive candles but not Chanukah candles.29
Likewise, prison officials repeatedly refused to allow Jewish prisoners to
miss meals on fast days or to obtain a sack lunch to breach their fast at
nightfall.30 These examples were legally tolerated because prior to
RLUIPA, administrators were permitted to enforce restrictions on
religious freedoms if the restrictions were reasonably related to executing
a valid penal interest—and quite often the administrators draped the
restrictions in the previously fail proof rationale of security.31
A. RLUIPA Effects
RLUIPA was formulated to address prison regulations with respect
to religious exercise that are “grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated
fears, or post-hoc rationalizations” clothed generally in the name of
security.32 However, heightened scrutiny, at least under RLUIPA’s
predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), did not
produce a particularly inmate friendly trend as judges continued to defer
to the asserted penal interests of correctional administrators.33 Instead
prison administrators have generally easily met RFRA’s and RLUIPA’s
compelling interest prong and courts have not strictly enforced the least
restrictive means requirement.34 Accordingly, some commentators claim
that RLUIPA like RFRA has not changed the nature of inmate religious
rights at all.35 However, unlike RFRA, RLUIPA defines religious
exercise much more broadly so that it may be easier to initially advance a
claim as religious and thus covered by RLUIPA.36

29. See Protecting Religious Liberty After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 3, at 41 (1988)
hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Isaac Jaroslawicz). Votive candles are used by Christians as part
of a devotional worship whereas Chanukah candles are used by some Jews in worship. See
http://ohr.edu/yhiy/article.php/1318 (last vistited Mar. 25, 2005).
30. See Hearing, supra note 29, at 43.
31. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1894 n.19 (reporting prison official testimony on
how regulations have traditionally been characterized in terms of security in order to pass judicial
scrutiny).
32. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
33. Developments, supra note 18, at 1894.
34. Id. Additional review of the effects of RLUIPA, regardless of its constitutionality, is
warranted. At least one article questions whether RFRA and RLUIPA are simply restatements of the
law established in Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and
thus are unnecessary and possibly will inhibit judicial discretion and creativity. See Sara Smolik, The
Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was it a Waste? 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723 (2004)
(discussing whether RLUIPA was really necessary).
35. See Sara Smolik, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was it a Waste? 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723 (2004).
36. Developments, supra note 18, at 1895.
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III. BACKGROUND: RELIGIOUS RIGHTS FRAMEWORK AND RLUIPA
Section three of RLUIPA is a legislative enhancement of the
protection afforded institutionalized persons’ religious expression
beyond that guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.37 Instituting a strict
standard of review for otherwise religious-neutral governmental actions
that burden institutionalized individuals’ religious activity enhances
protection. Although the Act is relatively new and specific to
institutionalized persons, the quest of determining the standard of review
required by the Free Exercise Clause, yet permitted by the Establishment
Clause, long predates the Act’s passage. Thus RLUIPA, although rather
unique in its application, is yet another effort at promulgating a general
standard of review for governmental actions that impede upon individual
religious expression; in so doing it attempts to safeguard individual
religious freedoms while balancing concerns for impermissible
governmental sponsorship of religion.38
A. A Standard In Flux
The Court’s modern Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is a
labyrinth of balancing and factor tests that have fluctuated in acceptance
and use most notably since the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner. 39 In
Sherbert, the Court, similar to Congress with RLUIPA, embraced a strict
scrutiny test for analyzing all neutral government actions that
substantially burden religious practice.40 This test provided that any
otherwise neutral public law that burdens religious expression must be
“in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and must be the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”41
Although strict scrutiny was the test for Free Exercise Clause
analysis, in practice the Court narrowly interpreted the Sherbert test. In
effect the Court largely replaced strict scrutiny with a rational basis
scrutiny test until it became the de facto Free Exercise Clause test for
most situations.42 In contrast to strict scrutiny, this less intensive scrutiny
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2004).
38. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
39. See Anne Y. Chiu, Note & Comment, When Prisoners are Weary and Their Religious
Exercise Burdened, RLUIPA Provides Some Rest for their Souls, 79 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1002-03
(2004); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
40. 374 U.S. 398 (1963), overruled in part by Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. of Or.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
41. Id.
42. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), superseded by statute.
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test requires courts to consider: (1) if there is a “valid, rational
connection” between a neutral law and a legitimate government interest;
(2) if the burdened person has alternative means of exercising the right in
question; (3) the impact of a requested accommodation upon
governmental interests; and (4) the absence of alternatives to the law or
regulation.43 The practice of narrowly applying the Sherbert test in favor
of the rational basis test became the rule in Employment Division,
Deparment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.44 In Smith, the
Court explained that the Free Exercise Clause did not require strict
scrutiny of neutral laws that incidentally burden religious expression
except in limited situations.45 Instead the Court interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause as only requiring the application of the rational basis
test.46 However, it explained that the Establishment Clause did not
prohibit the strict scrutiny standard and invited concerned legislatures to
consider enhancing religious legal protections by adopting a stricter
standard than constitutionally required.47
B. RLUIPA: A Legislative Response
Responding to Smith’s invitation and reacting to the widespread
perception that Smith eviscerated Free Exercise protections, Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).48 Like
RLUIPA, RFRA employed a strict scrutiny test but applied it to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment.49 However, principally because
RFRA rested on the slender reed of the Fourteenth Amendment for
applicability to states, the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores held that
RFRA violated principles of federalism and thus was not applicable to
states or their subdivisions.50 However, the constitutionality of its strict

43. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987), superseded by statute (citing
Block v. Rutherford, 468 US 576, 586 (1984)).
44. See 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statute. Smith involved the constitutionality
of an Oregon law that in effect criminalized the use of a hallucinogenic drug commonly called
peyote unless prescribed by a medical practitioner. See id. at 874. The respondents used the drug as
part of a sacramental right in the Native American Church. Their use of peyote resulted in dismissal
from their jobs and refusal of unemployment benefits from the state. Id. In holding that Oregon’s law
was constitutional, the case became significant for redefining the scrutiny level for Court’s review of
the constitutionality of otherwise neutral laws that impede religious expression. Id.
45. See id. at 880-87 (allowing strict scrutiny to apply to laws that burden the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutionally protected rights. For example, when more than one
constitutionally protected right was involved, a higher level of scrutiny was permissible.).
46. See id. at 885-87.
47. Id. at 890.
48. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997), superseded by statute.
49. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 260 (6th Cir. 2003).
50. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
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scrutiny standard was not specifically addressed; consequently, RFRA
and its strict scrutiny standard continue to be applicable on a Federal
level.51 Despite RFRA’s failure Congress was still eager to curtail what it
perceived as widespread state and local governmental action that
impinged individuals’ freedom of religious exercise. Congress responded
to Boerne with RLUIPA.52 Anxious to avoid another confrontation with
the Court, the Act’s co-sponsors, Senators Hatch and Kennedy,
attempted to answer the Court’s Federalism concerns set forth in Boerne
by bypassing the 14th Amendment and limiting RLUIPA’s scope.53
Accordingly, the Act applies to states under the Spending and Commerce
Clauses and is limited to zoning and institutional settings.54 Specifically,
it uses the Spending and Commerce Clauses to apply to state’s actions
affecting zoning and institutional settings that receive Federal financial
assistance or where the substantial burden on religion affects or its
removal would affect commerce among the states, with foreign nations,
or with Indian tribes.55 In regard to its institutional application, the
positive requirements and limitations of the pertinent portion of
RLUIPA, section three, are as follows:
Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons
(a) General rule. No government shall impose a substantial burden on
the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution, . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
(b) Scope of application. This section applies in any case in which—
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that
receives Federal financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial

51. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 260; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (holding that RFRA is unconstitutional
as applied to states because Congress exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment because
it went beyond Fifth Amendment power to prevent abuse of religious rights to impermissibly
defining those rights).
52. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
53. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 260.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2004).
55. Id.
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burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States, or with Indian tribes.56

To increase the likelihood of enforcement, RLUIPA provides for
both a governmental and a private right of action.57 Yet, given the need
for order and safety in institutionalized settings, the Act’s sponsors
sought prudential limitations to enforcement of truly egregious or
otherwise unjustified instances of religious burdening.58 This desire is
primarily expressed through RLUIPA’s internal limitations such as
permitting a law to burden religious expression if it serves a compelling
governmental interest that may not be carried out in a less restrictive
manner.59 In addition, Senators Hatch and Kennedy sought self-imposed
judicial limitations by cautioning courts enforcing RLUIPA to continue
giving deference to institutional administrators’ regulations given the
considerations of security, discipline, and cost inherent to institutions.60
Considering the enumerated precautions Congress took in ensuring
RLUIPA’s constitutionality, it is not surprising that a number of courts
considering challenges to RLUIPA have determined it is constitutional.61
This context makes the Sixth Circuit’s lone opposition to RLUIPA in
Cutter all the more unusual and deserving of judicial review. Although
the Cutter court originally drew support for its holding from two district
court decisions in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, both decisions have
subsequently been overruled by their respective circuits.62 Thus, two
circuits have come to the exact opposite conclusion regarding RLUIPA’s
First Amendment constitutionality, and similarly, at least five circuits
have concluded that the identical operative language in RFRA does not
violate the Establishment Clause.63
IV. FACTS: CUTTER V. WILKINSON
Cutter v. Wilkinson is a compilation of three trial court cases in
which inmates challenged several Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections (“ODRC”) decisions that they claimed violated RLUIPA by

56. Id.
57. § 2000cc-2(a). Note that plaintiffs in Cutter were able to sue state officials in federal
court under the fiction of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
58. CONG. REC. S7774-01,S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy).
59. Id. at S7774.
60. Id. at S7775.
61. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 261-62 (6th Cir. 2003).
62. Id. at 257, 262.
63. Id. at 257, 261-62.
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denying their various requests for religious accommodations.64 Although
their claims are interesting, the facts of the individual cases are not
particularly relevant.65 The common issue that is relevant to the
consolidation of these three cases is Ohio’s challenge to RLUIPA’s
constitutionality.66
A. Procedural History: Cutter v. Wilkinson
Prior to consolidation of the three cases the individual plaintiffs
initially brought claims against ODRC officials under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.67 While the individual cases were pending,
Congress passed RLUIPA and the plaintiffs amended their complaints to
include claims under the Act.68 The defendants responded with motions
to dismiss the RLUIPA claims, arguing that RLUIPA is unconstitutional
because it violates the Establishment Clause and exceeds Congress’s
Spending and Commerce Clause powers in its application to states.69 The
United States intervened in the district court to defend RLUIPA’s
constitutionality, and the cases were consolidated to decide the motions
to dismiss.70 The motions were referred to a magistrate judge who
concluded that RLUIPA was constitutional and recommended the
motions be denied.71 The district court adopted the Magistrate’s
reasoning and recommendation and denied the motions, whereupon the
state of Ohio was granted leave to make an interlocutory appeal to the
Sixth Circuit.74 The Sixth Circuit accepted Ohio’s appeal and responded
by reversing the district court; it held that section three of RLUIPA
violates the Establishment Clause.75 The United States and various

64. Id. at 260.
65. Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833-34 (S.D. Ohio 2002). The inmates claims
involved what may be characterized as non-traditional religious requests such as delivery of white
supremacist literature. Id.
66. See generally Cutter, 349 F.3d at 260.
67. Memorandum in Support of the Plaintiff-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 023270, 02-3299, 02-3301).
68. Id. at 2-3.
69. Brief in Response to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for the United States in the Supreme
Court of the United States at 5, Cutter (No. 03-9877).
70. Id.
71. Petitions of United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at 4, Cutter (No. 02-3270, 02-3299, 02-3301).
72. Brief for Appellants at 23-25, Cutter (No. 03-9877).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 261, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Amicus Curiae in response petitioned the circuit court for a rehearing.76
The Sixth Circuit denied the petition and the petitioners, joined by the
defendants, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.77
On October 12, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the parties
on the issue of RLUIPA’s section three constitutionality and
subsequently scheduled oral arguments for April 19, 2005.78
V. ANALYSIS
The Establishment Clause of the Constitution states, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”79 The Free
Exercise clause instructs that Congress shall not make a law “prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.”80 The Supreme Court has interpreted these
juxtaposed clauses to collectively require that laws be religiously neutral
as a fundamental aspect of the First Amendment.81 Although such an
interpretation may seem reasonable, what neutrality means in concrete
terms leads to distinct differences of opinion.82 For example, neutrality
may mean that government may not support a particular religious sect
but may support religion in general.83 Or, conversely, neutrality may
mean that laws may not assist religion directly or indirectly.84 In short,
neutrality is not self-defining.
To give guidance to the judiciary as to a definition of neutrality, at
least in relation to the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court
enunciated the well-known Lemon test.85 The Lemon test provides that in
order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation a law must meet the
following three criteria: a statute (1) “must have a secular legislative
purpose,” (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) it must not create “excessive
government entanglement with religion.”86 The Lemon test fails,
however, to render any guidance in relation to the Free Exercise Clause.

76. E.g. Petitions of United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cutter (No. 02-3270, 02-3299, 02-3301).
77. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4294 (Mar. 3, 2004), Brief in Response to
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for the United States in the Supreme Court of the United States at 7,
Cutter (No. 03-9877).
78. Cutter, 349 F.3d 257, cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3229.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
80. Id.
81. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
82. E.g. Cutter, 349 F.3d 257.
83. Contra Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
84. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
86. Id. at 612-13.
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Instead, Free Exercise Clause analysis after Smith and until RFRA and
RLUIPA was analyzed under the judicially created rational relationship
test.87
To determine if RLUIPA’s standard of strict scrutiny violated the
Establishment Clause the Cutter court used the Lemon test as a
framework for its analysis.88 Under the test’s purpose prong, the court
conceded that RLUIPA might be permissible, although it expends
considerable space reasoning otherwise.89 Similarly the court determined
that RLUIPA does not violate the entanglement prong.90 However, the
court held that RLUIPA clearly violates the effect prong and is thus
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.91
A. Purpose Prong
The Lemon test’s purpose prong requires that a law have a “secular
legislative purpose.”92 In defining this requirement the Cutter court relied
on reasoning outlined in Edwards v. Aguillard to articulate the test for a
secular legislative purpose as asking whether the “government’s actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.”93 The court inferred the
governmental purpose based upon the law’s effects on religious rights as
compared to other constitutionally protected rights.94 If governmental
action offered additional protection to religious rights without similarly
protecting other constitutionally protected rights, the court reasoned that
such action had the impermissible purpose of endorsing religion.95
However, this so-called lockstep requirement was rejected in Amos.96 In
Amos the Court stated that it is a permitted governmental purpose “to
alleviate significant governmental interference” with religious expression
even without similarly affecting other constitutionally protected rights.97
So, although Congress does not have a constitutional duty to remove or
mitigate burdens on religious exercise, it is not forbidden from removing
such burdens.98 Accordingly, the plaintiffs in this case claim that
87. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
88. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 2003).
89. See id. at 264.
90. Id. at 267-68.
91. Id.
92. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
93. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987)).
94. Id. at 264.
95. Id. at 262-64.
96. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
97. See id. at 335.
98. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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RLUIPA, via the strict scrutiny test, does exactly what Amos said is a
permissible purpose: alleviate significant governmental burdens on
religious exercise, albeit in an institutional setting.99
1. The Amos decision
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos considered the dismissal of various employees
from nonprofit facilities owned and organized as corporations controlled
by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Church”).100 The
employees were discharged for failing to meet certain religious
requirements of the Church.101 The disgruntled former employees sued
the Church under § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Utah’s District
Court claiming they were impermissibly dismissed due to religious
discrimination.102 The Church replied that it was exempt from the
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment by § 702 of
that Act.103 Section 702 provides that religious employers may be
permissibly exempt from the prohibition on religious discrimination in
employment.104 However, the district court held that the § 702 exemption
did not apply and furthermore that § 702 violated the effects prong of the
Lemon test and thus was unconstitutional.105 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed. Using the Lemon test, the Court determined that
government may—and at times must—accommodate religious
practices.106 Furthermore, the Court held that the Church acted properly
in dismissing the employees because the Church’s actions were covered
by the religion exemption in § 702.107
The Court held that the § 702 exemption satisfied the Lemon test in
the following ways. First, under the purpose prong the Court reasoned
that although not required by the Free Exercise Clause it is a permissible
legislative purpose to alleviate significant government interference with
the ability of religious organizations to carry out their religious
missions.108 Second, under the effects prong the Court determined that §
99. Brief for Appellants at 24, Cutter (No. 02-3270).
100. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330. The referenced church is often referred to by the moniker
“Mormon” although it does not officially recognize that appellation.
101. Id. Eligibility to attend temples is premised upon compliance with Church requirements
such as meeting attendance and abstinence from alcohol and tobacco use.
102. Id. at 331.
103. Id.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2004).
105. Amos, 483 U.S. at 331-33.
106. Id. at 334-40.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 335.
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702 is not unconstitutional because it allows religious organizations to
advance their legal and stated purpose: promoting religion without
simultaneously enhancing protection of other constitutional freedoms.109
Instead, to violate the effects prong, the Court explained that government
itself would have to advance religion through financial support or active
involvement and not simply by removing governmental burdens upon
religious activities.110 Finally, the Court explained that instead of
entangling church and state § 702 aided in separating the two by
avoiding governmental inquiry into religious belief to determine if a
particular job is truly religiously connected.111
2. Differentiating Amos
Apparently recognizing the threat Amos posed to their decision, the
Cutter court attempted to differentiate Amos. It attempted to do so by
emphasizing the factual difference in Amos and Cutter. Namely that §
702 in Amos was necessary to alleviate possible Establishment Clause
violations, whereas RLUIPA elevated religious rights protection above
an already constitutionally acceptable level.112 Furthermore, the court
claimed that RLUIPA is much larger in scope than the Amos § 702
exception, thus casting Amos as a narrow exception to the general rule.113
In so doing the court failed to adequately distinguish Amos so as to make
its reasoning inapplicable.
For example, initially the Cutter court focused on the Supreme
Court’s characterization of § 702 in Amos as necessary to avoid a
violation of the Establishment Clause.114 In contrast, the court explained
that RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard was not necessary to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause since the Court in Smith had
previously established the rational relationship test as adequate for
Establishment Clause analysis.115 The Cutter court concluded that
because RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause
violation, Amos is distinguishable and its reasoning is not applicable to
this case.116 The reasoning underpinning this conclusion, however, is
fundamentally flawed in at least two ways.
First, like Cutter, the Amos Court applied the Lemon test in
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 337-39.
Id. at 337 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
Id. at 339.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id. at 263-64.
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evaluating a law’s constitutionality in relation to the Establishment
Clause.117 Although ostensibly differing motivations underlie the subject
statutes in Amos and Cutter, the Court’s Lemon test reasoning is nonethe-less generally applicable to an analysis of RLUIPA or any other
law’s constitutionality under the Establishment Clause.118 Thus, differing
statutes do not warrant individualized purpose prong tests. This
conclusion is supported by the widespread use of the Amos Court’s
reasoning by a number of courts analyzing the strict scrutiny test
embodied in RFRA and RLUIPA.119
Second, and more importantly, in concluding that Amos was not
applicable because RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation, the court appears to treat the standard of
review for Free Exercise Clause analysis as a relevant test for
Establishment Clause analysis. This is flawed. As mentioned above, the
court reasoned that RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid a violation of
the Establishment Clause.120 While this may be a valid conclusion, the
court errs in its explanation of why RLUIPA was not necessary to avoid
an Establishment Clause violation: Because the Supreme Court had
already approved rational relationship review for laws that interfered
with prisoners’ fundamental rights, RLUIPA’s heightened standard was
unnecessary.121 Again, this too is a correct statement, although it should
be noted that just because a standard is unnecessary does not make it
impermissible. Regardless, the relevant error in reasoning here is
concluding that the already established rational relationship standard
somehow prevented Establishment Clause violations. This is simply
incorrect—the referenced standards of review pertain to Free Exercise
clause and not Establishment Clause analysis.122 Although the court had
held that the rational relationship standard did not violate the
Establishment Clause, its principle purpose was to establish a floor for
analysis of Free Exercise Clause analysis. The afore-referenced Lemon
test is the applicable Establishment Clause test. Thus, comparison of the
purposes of the underlying statutes at issue in Amos and Cutter is, as
ironically noted by a RLUIPA critic, “like comparing apples and
oranges” and misses the point that the shared and relevant analysis
between the two cases is their application of the Lemon test.123
117. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-39; Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262-66.
118. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-39 (suggesting that the Lemon test is the generally applicable
test for Establishment Clause analysis).
119. E.g. Madison v. Riter 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
120. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263.
121. Id. at 263-66.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
123. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 268 (citing Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration
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3. Purpose prong and RLUIPA’s scope
In addition to the misplaced comparison of the purposes of the
subject statutes in Amos and Cutter, the court claims that Amos is further
distinguishable because RLUIPA is much larger in scope than the
exception in Amos.124 The court uses the issue of scope by suggesting
RLUIPA has an impermissible purpose due to and evidenced by its
broader sweep.125 For example, it explains that unlike the exemption in
Amos, RLUIPA does not remove a narrow obstacle to religious exercise
but rather applies to any number of present and future governmental
regulations.126 Although the court stops short of declaring Congress
disingenuous in stating that its purpose was accommodating religion by
needlessly removing unnecessary obstacles, it implies that RLUIPA’s
effectual purpose is not the required secular purpose of protecting
religious expression under the Free Exercise clause.127 Instead the court
determines that RLUIPA’s purpose is to advance religion in institutional
settings.128
The crux of this reasoning is that RLUIPA has in effect a prohibited
purpose imputed by the Act’s protection of religious freedoms without
simultaneously affording protection to other constitutionally protected
conduct.129 Yet, the reasoning that RLUIPA does not protect
constitutional freedoms in a lockstep fashion seems to be a fault of too
narrow a sweep rather than too broad.130 Regardless, the perceived failure
to simultaneously protect constitutionally protected forms of conduct is
not a controlling constitutional test.131 Instead this test appears to be
based on Justice Steven’s dicta in a concurring opinion that neutrality
dictates that governmental actions may not tend to favor religion over
irreligion.132 While perhaps persuasive to the court, it is not controlling—
Amos is. In an apparent recognition of its weakness in distinguishing
Amos and in using non-precedential factors to evaluate RLUIPA under
the purpose prong, the court ends its purpose prong analysis abruptly by
explaining that even if RLUIPA has a permissible purpose under Amos it

Act is Unconstitutional, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 13-14. (1998)).
124. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263-64.
125. Id. at 263-64.
126. See id. at 264.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 264-65
130. See id.
131. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
132. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37; Amos, 483 U.S. at 327, 337 (1987).
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nevertheless fails the effects prong.133
B. Effects Prong
Because the court at least entertains the idea that RLUIPA has a
permissible purpose and concludes that RLUIPA does not violate the
entanglement prong, the court’s holding rests on its effects prong
analysis.134 The court concludes that RLUIPA has the impermissible
effect of inducing institutionalized persons to religious activity by
relying on a pre-Amos test of the effects prong.135 This old test asks
whether the law or practice under review “conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval” as evidenced by protecting religious rights
without similarly advancing other constitutional rights.136 This again is a
reiteration of the so-called lockstep rule.137 In evaluating Cutter for
impermissible effects under this lockstep rule, the court relied on the
Ghashiyah court’s two factor test to determine whether RLUIPA
conveys a message of governmental endorsement of religion by
protecting religious rights without similarly enhancing protection of
other constitutional rights.138 These two factors are (1) whether the
governmental action benefits both secular and religious entities, and (2)
whether the action will induce rather than merely protect religious
exercise.139 Under both factors the court essentially considers the same
aspects of RLUIPA but asks different questions.140
In its discussion of the first Ghashiyah factor, the Cutter court
analyzed whether the governmental action benefits both secular and
religious entities in tandem—again, the lockstep rule.141 Similar to the
court’s conclusion under its purpose prong analysis, the court concluded
under this factor that RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard fails to
simultaneously advance secular and religious freedoms.142 Thus, the
court reasoned that RLUIPA has the effect of sending a message of
governmental endorsement of religion.143 In support of this conclusion
133. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264.
134. Id. at 264-68.
135. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264 (citing Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)).
136. Id.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93; See infra text accompanying note 138.
138. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264 (citing Ghashiyah v. Dept. of Corr. of the State of Wis., 250 F.
Supp. 2d 1016, 1025 -26 (E.D. Wis. 2003), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th
Cir. 2003)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 264-67.
141. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267.
142. Id. at 265-67.
143. Id.
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the court largely relied on a district court’s assessment in Madison v.
Riter that RLUIPA switches the burden of proof from an inmate to prison
officials.144 After citing numerous examples of how this represents a
change from the status quo the court summed up its estimation of the
effect of this change by again citing Madison: “it is hard to imagine a
greater reversal of fortunes for the religious rights of inmates than the
one involved in . . . RLUIPA” without any corresponding secular
benefit.145 Despite this reversal of prisoners’ fortunes, the court does not
indicate how the enhanced standard is unconstitutional or otherwise
illegal.146 Instead it attempts to present the appearance of an Act that has
so drastically changed the balance of religious to secular rights so as to
unquestionably establish an endorsement of religion by the state.147
Regardless of the change in the balance of protection for religious
and other constitutional rights, this lockstep rule is simply not a
controlling Establishment Clause or effects prong test.148 Instead, this test
appears to be derived from a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens
reasoning that government may not support religion over irreligion.149 As
a derivative of Justice Stevens’ reasoning comes the notion that religious
rights may not be granted greater protection than other constitutionally
guaranteed rights unless there is some identifiable need for greater
protection.150 Therefore, this test is not derived from controlling common
or statutory law and was clearly rejected by the Amos court.151 However,
assuming that this is a valid requirement, RLUIPA does not enhance
religious rights protection to an extent that induces institutionalized
persons to practice religion.152 Furthermore, under the second Ghashiyah
factor—at least in institutional settings—there is arguably an identifiable
need for greater protection of religious freedoms.
For example, in regard to the court’s claim that RLUIPA’s
enhancement of protections for religious rights induces persons to
practice religion, the court explains that under strict scrutiny prison
officials bear the burden of proof instead of the plaintiff prisoners.153 Yet,
144. Id. at 265 (citing Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 575 (W.D. Va. 2003), overruled
by Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003)).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See generally id. at 266.
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
149. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997).
150. See id.
151. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Cutter, 349 F. 3d at 264 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
690 (1984)).
152. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
153. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265-67.
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it fails to mention that prior to the prison officials bearing the burden of
proof a claimant must first offer prima facie evidence of a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause.154 Regarding this point, Senator Hatch
explained that the “party asserting a violation of this Act shall in all cases
bear the burden of proof that the governmental action in question
constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise.”155 Furthermore, if
the government provides prima facie evidence that it has offered to make
an accommodation to relieve the substantial burden the claimant then has
the burden to show that the proposed accommodation is unreasonable or
ineffective in relieving the burden.156 Both Senators Hatch and Kennedy
expected the courts to continue to give deference to the experience of
prison administrators in establishing regulations necessary to maintain
security.157 They believed, however, that the Act’s enhancement of the
burden of proof on the government would assist prisoners in challenging
regulations based on mere speculation or justified by post-hoc
rationalizations.158 Thus, although the lockstep rule is not controlling,
even if it is an applicable test, the court fails to show that strict scrutiny
shifts the burden of proof such that religious rights are granted excessive
protection resulting in the impermissible effect of government inducing
institutionalized persons’ religious activity.
The second Ghashiyah factor asks if the Act will induce rather than
simply protect religious exercise.159 Under this factor the court
determined that RLUIPA has the effect of encouraging prisoners to be
religious in order to enjoy greater rights and thus fails to satisfy this
factor.160 In doing so, the court relies upon its own circuit court test that
asks “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the enactment would view it as state
endorsement of religion.”161 However, this circuit court test was derived
from Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, in which the Supreme Court
considered a statute’s effect on nonreligious persons as part of an effect
analysis. But it did so in the context of government compelling nonadherents to support religious practice as opposed to a possible
enticement to do so.162 Thus, the case is factually dissimilar from Cutter
154. Id. at 265; 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
155. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
156. Id.
157. Id. at S7775.
158. Id.
159. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264.
160. Id. at 266.
161. Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 484 (6th Cir. 2002).
162. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989). This
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and the rule is not applicable in this context.
Yet, like the first factor, even if the second factor is applicable
RLUIPA is in compliance. For example, the court reasons that RLUIPA
will allow religious adherents special rights, and as a result, other
prisoners will feel compelled to become religious in order to enjoy
similar benefits.163 This implies that RLUIPA will somehow prevent
substantive prison rules from applying with equal force to the religious
and irreligious. This is not correct. As noted earlier, Senators Hatch and
Kennedy both stated on the record that they expected courts to continue
to give deference to prison administrators in terms of rules of safety and
order.164 In addition, even if RLUIPA does grant religious activity greater
protections than other activities, it is hard to imagine that the so-called
extra freedoms that will accrue to religious activity will be a substantive
attraction to the irreligious. RLUIPA’s legislative history illustrates this
point. The history cites as evidence of the need for RLUIPA instances of
prison authorities surreptitiously recording the confession of a prisoner to
his priest and an instance where a prisoner was permitted to attend a
religious service but forbidden to take communion.165 If RLUIPA allows
prisoners to confess in private or partake of communion it is difficult to
imagine similarly permissible freedoms enticing a large or even a
minimal number of non-religious prisoners to profess religious
adherence.
Likewise, because the strict scrutiny test is self-limiting, the
government will have ample opportunity to prevent the accrual of
generally attractive rights that are otherwise disruptive to an institutional
setting. The test is self-limiting by allowing the government an
opportunity to establish regulations that burden religion provided it can
establish a compelling governmental interest and show that the goal of
the regulation is accomplished by the least restrictive means.166
Combined with Senator Hatch’s admonitions to courts to give deference
to prison administrators’ expertise, such a test allows prison officials to
continue to limit any religious expression that will otherwise threaten

case considered a statute’s effect on nonreligious persons as part of the effect analysis. However, it is
only a plurality opinion and simply held that the government may not compel non-adherents to
support religious practices. The question then remains as to the court’s contention that failure to
protect other constitutional rights in lockstep with religious rights de facto compels non-adherents to
support religious practices.
163. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 266.
164. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
165. Id.
166. CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy).
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safety and order.167 This deduction is supported by empirical evidence
gathered under RFRA.168 This evidence, complied by the Department of
Justice, demonstrated that RFRA’s strict scrutiny requirement had not
been an unreasonable burden to the Federal prison system.169 For
example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons experienced only sixty-five
RFRA suits during RFRA’s six-year life, and the Justice Department
points out that most of those alleged other legal theories and thus would
have been filed anyway.170
In summary, as in its purpose prong analysis, in its effects prong
analysis the Cutter court relied on an improper differentiation of Amos,
which resulted in its use of non-controlling tests, flawed reasoning, and
an incorrect determination that RLUIPA has impermissible effects.
C. Entanglement Prong
Under the final Lemon prong, entanglement, the court must
determine whether RLUIPA results in an excessive entanglement of
government and religion.171 The court appropriately rejects Ghashiyah’s
overzealous analysis and recognizes that RLUIPA does not require any
greater interaction between government officials and religion than
existed under the rational relationship standard.172 Indeed, the court
appears to acquiesce to the fact enunciated in Amos that government,
under current jurisprudence, is able to legislate regarding religion and
must to some degree be entangled with it.173 Thus, it is not a matter of
whether government may be involved with religion but to what degree it
is involved.174 Because RLUIPA does not promote any greater
government involvement than permissibly existed previously it does not
violate this prong.

167. Id. at S7775.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. A study of RFRA cases showed that of the inmate religious claims that reached trial,
only nine percent were successful. Developments in the Law – The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1838, 1894 (2002). Apparently, administrators easily met RFRA’s (now RLUIPA’s)
compelling interest prong while courts generally ignored the least restrictive means requirement. Id.
Furthermore, in connection with RFRA’s passage and applicable to RLUIPA, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act was passed, requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit
under any federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
171. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
172. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267-68 (6th Cir. 2003).
173. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35, 338 (1987).
174. Id.
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D. Note on RLUIPA’s Jurisprudential Foundation
Although the Supreme Court in Smith held that a rational
relationship was the only test required by the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court recognized it as the floor and not the ceiling of legislatively
available Free Exercise requirements.175 Accordingly, the Smith Court
invited legislatures concerned with Free Exercise limitations to increase
available protection as RLUIPA attempts to do.176 Although the Act does
change the burden of proof, the change is not so drastic as to do what this
court implies: make the burden on the government so high as to send a
message of governmental endorsement of religion and overstep Smith’s
invitation to increase Free Exercise protections.177 Instead, with the strict
scrutiny standard, RLUIPA—legislatively and according to Smith—
permissively elevates Free Exercise analysis above the constitutionally
mandated base rational relationship standard without penetrating the
Establishment Clause’s ceiling.178
VI. RLUIPA’s WEAKNESSES: NOT A JUDICIAL PROBLEM
Despite RLUIPA’s probable constitutionality, it is not necessarily
effective or appropriate legislation. In fact, although the Justice
Department and Senators Hatch and Kennedy claim that RFRA has not
and RLUIPA will not significantly increase the burden on state
institutional administrators, state administrators strongly claim
otherwise.179 These interested parties render an impassioned pleading
against RLUIPA on account of the burdens that they claim it imposes as
evidenced by their experience under RFRA.180 Such burdens include
complicating the task of “combating gangs” or diverting resources to
responding to requests for special religious accommodations.181 These
appear to be valid concerns that give one pause when considering the
wisdom of RLUIPA in an institutional setting. However, Ohio’s
experience with RLUIPA may not be representative of most states. As
the defendants in Cutter recognized, the problems they experienced
under RFRA’s strict scrutiny test may be unique to them because Ohio
has a greater problem with white supremacist groups than most other
175. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 449 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
176. Id.
177. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265.
178. See Smith, 449 U.S. at 890.
179. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senators Hatch
and Kennedy); Defendant-Appellants’ Final Opening Brief at 1-2 & 9-10, Cutter (No. 02-3270).
180. Defendant-Appellants’ Final Opening Brief at 1-2, Cutter (No. 02-3270).
181. Id.
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states.182 Such inmate groups are the largest and most sophisticated in
Ohio’s correctional system and presumably the most active in invoking
the protection of RFRA.183 In their effort to avoid these burdens,
appellants ought to direct such policy-based arguments to Congress and
save the courts for adjudication, not legislation.184 Although the courts
must determine the constitutionality of the law, Congress is best suited to
hear and act based on policy concerns.185
VII. CONCLUSION
RLUIPA is certainly not a perfect law in the eyes of supporters who
wish for it to be applied more broadly, nor of detractors who, among
other things, consider it overtly burdensome.186 However, it is
constitutional. This court makes an admirable effort to rationalize its
holding but instead should have followed the controlling reasoning of
Amos to hold for RLUIPA’s constitutionality. Upon review of this
decision, the Supreme Court should utilize the Lemon test as explained in
Amos. In so doing, the Court may find it helpful to consider the excellent
application of Amos reasoning to RLUIPA as found in Madison v.
Riter187 and leave further policy or political arguments regarding
RLUIPA to Congress.
James B. McMullin

182. Id.
183. Id. at 14-16, Cutter (No. 02-3270).
184. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47 & 48 (James Madison) (quoting Baron de Montesquieu
who stated, “‘there can be no liberty . . . if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers’”).
185. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding that legislatures, or in this case agencies, by virtue of their delegated authority, are
better positioned than courts to analyze competing policy arguments when Congress has not directly
spoken to the issue).
186. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy); Defendant-Appellants’ Final Opening Brief at 1-2, Cutter (No. 02-3270).
187. 355 F.3d 310 (2003).

